

Foreign Affairs: How Darkly the Glass?

By C. L. SULZBERGER

WASHINGTON—Maybe the most frightening lesson of the Arab-Israeli war is its vivid demonstration of how wrong Soviet information can sometimes be. If Moscow's intelligence appraisal of the Middle East was so lopsided, what must we assume about Moscow's intelligence appraisal in other areas—Vietnam, for example?

Maybe it is comforting to think the Russians may be so wrong, and as a consequence their cause can take a terrific beating. It is pleasant to reckon the bill for weapons lost and to ponder the future of Kremlin agents and diplomats who gilded the Egyptian and Syrian lilies.

No Sign of Change

The fact that—as confirmed by Premier Kosygin—Moscow has resolved to regain by diplomatic pressures what was lost in battle and has resumed dispatch of weapons to Arab clients while beating the U.N. propaganda tomtom doesn't indicate a peaceful future in the Middle East. Nor does it imply improvement in the system of Soviet intelligence appraisal.

For if this new investment in armaments can bolster the Gov-

ernment of Syria, Moscow's favorite "radical" Arab regime, it is less likely to insure another lease on Nasser's political life. Nasser is the most popular and charismatic local leader since Saladin, but the harvest of his whirlwind could soon fall due.

Within a few weeks three simultaneous crises are almost inevitable in Egypt. The economic situation, rendered uglier by the halt of tourism and Suez traffic, will become desperate. Full news of the Sinai disaster is spreading as soldiers tell their tale in the villages. And middle-grade officers are asking increasingly who was responsible for getting them chewed up.

It will take all Nasser's genius for recovery to ride the ensuing storm and it will require more than Russian words and weapons to camouflage the disaster. Furthermore, news from Yemen may shortly turn sour. Nasser withdrew 10,000 men from a garrison already doing badly. The military springboard from which he and his Soviet friends hoped to jump into Aden and menace Saudi Arabia is becoming soggy.

It will be particularly interesting to see whether, behind their propaganda torrent this week, the Russians show any calmer, more sensible approach

to the underlying problems which continue to threaten peace.

Strangely enough, it is as much in our own interest as in Russia's that there should be an overhaul in the Soviet system of intelligence appraisal and assurance that a calm, unbiased method of analyzing facts is installed. Otherwise the world can never reckon that it may not some day risk a holocaust by mistake.

Unless both superpowers possess and use the mechanisms for objective analysis of each other's problems and intentions, it will be impossible for Moscow to predict Washington's reaction in any given circumstance—or vice versa.

Basic Premises

All ultimate planning by both defense staffs is founded upon the theory that each is aware of the consecutive moves the other may be expected to make in a worsening crisis. Our general's "Stepladder to Extinction" for John Bucha's "30 Steps." The assumption of U.S. strategy, flexible response, is based on the thought that crises can be controlled and wars limited—because nothing else makes sense.

Over recent years circumstan-

tial evidence has tended to confirm this assumption. We have been able to study changed Soviet military maneuvers, to read the altered emphasis of their strategic thinkers, and even to judge their reactions in tense and dangerous situations.

But, even if the methodology of controlled response and the objective of avoiding catastrophe is imputed by each side to the other, no such system can function unless it is built upon objective, accurate analysis.

Instant Terror's Reign

If, for example, a deliberate U.S. signal in Southeast Asia were simply misread in Moscow, we might all be in serious trouble. In today's uneasy world of instant terror it is more than ever imperative that facts be correctly discerned and analyzed.

Too, we have gradually grown into the habit of assuming that such a system, founded on accurate appraisal and structured on logic, applies in Moscow as well as in Washington. Now, after seeing how the Russians gummed up the Middle East, we can no longer count on anything. If the Kremlin still peers through a distorted mirror, everyone's future looks blotchy at best.

CIA Said to Aid Indian Parties

Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI, June 17—India's almost anonymous Central Intelligence Department (CID) reportedly has found that India political parties received contributions from both the American CIA and the Communist embassies during last February's general election campaign. The charge has started lively political debate here.

Home Minister Yeshwantrao Balwantrao Chavan has admitted in Parliament that CID reports on the election campaign were submitted to him a few days ago, but he characterized them as raw material.

He said his ministry had not

had time to go through them and make any conclusions.

Parliament was aroused after an article in the New York Times by its correspondent in India, Joseph Lelyveld, reported that the CID had concluded that at least one official of the American Embassy here had helped disperse election money to candidates of the anti-Communist Swatantra, Jan Sangh and Praja Socialist parties, as well as to some candidates of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's own governing Congress Party.

According to the New York Times account, the CID also concluded that Communist embassies had dispersed even greater amounts to India's

several Communist parties.

Estimates of the overall foreign financing varied from the equivalent of \$27,000 to \$130,000.

An American Embassy spokesman has issued an official denial of any such U.S. money being used and cited a recent article by Ambassador Chester Bowles on the folly of trying to inject the Cold War into India's domestic scene.

Representatives of all of India's political parties—right as well as left—have also issued indignant denials on the floor of parliament and pressed for an investigation into the CID's